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BENEFITS FOR
CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS?*
Two recent cases at opposite ends of the country, one in Massachu-
setts and the other in California, deal with the question of whether consci-
entious objectors who have performed the required two years "alternative
service . . . in the national interest"' should be deemed eligible to receive
veterans' educational benefits. 2 In Robison v. Johnson,3 the United States
District Court in Massachusetts ruled that the veterans' educational bene-
fits legislation was violative of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment because it excluded performers of alternative service whose lives, in
the court's view, are disrupted to the same extent as veterans of active
military service. Faced with the option of invalidating the legislation or
judicially extending it' to include alternative service performers, the court
chose to follow the latter course and declared that "plaintiff
[conscientious objector] and the members of his class . . . are to be
considered 'eligible', . . . to receive [educational] benefits . . . to the
same degree and extent as veterans of 'active duty' . . . .," This decision
has been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
In Hernandez v. Veterans Administration,' the District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed, on jurisdictional grounds,7 an
* This article is a student work prepared by Arthur A. Silverstein, a member of the ST.
JOHN'S LAW REVmw and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
' 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j) (1970).
2 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a) (1970).
352 F. Supp. 848 (D. Mass. 1973).
1 In recognizing this option, the court relied on Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). Justice Harlan was of the view that it would more nearly
accord with Congress' wishes to "recast" unconstitutional legislation than to discard it alto-
gether:
Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial alter-
natives: a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend
to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of
the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusions.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See note 39 infra.
352 F. Supp. at 862.
339 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 467 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. granted,
41 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. May 14, 1973).
' 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970) provides that no United States court has jurisdiction to review
decisions by the Administrator of the Veterans Administration on "questions of law or fact
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action by conscientious objectors who had fulfilled their alternative service
requirements for injunctive relief from the Veterans Administration's de-
nial of educational benefits, and mandamus, requiring the Veterans Ad-
ministration to pay these benefits. The court also denied a request that a
three-judge court be impaneled to hear claims that the veterans' educa-
tional benefits statute is unconstitutional on first and fifth amendment
grounds, ruling that the claims were without merit or substance because
of the "manifest difference" between military veterans and performers of
alternative service. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision! The Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari.9
As will be shown, the modes of reasoning of the two district courts
differ on the basic question of whether the grant of benefits to one group
and the denial of the same benefits to the other is justifiable on constitu-
tional grounds. First, however, it will be helpful to discuss the background
of (1) the conscientious objector status, (2) the corresponding requirement
of performance of alternative service, and (3) the veterans' educational
benefits legislation in question.
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
The right to refuse to bear arms is not constitutionally guaranteed; it
stems from acts of Congress, which "may grant or withhold the exemption
[from military service] as in its wisdom it sees fit."' 0 However, that a
statutory exemption from military service should be provided for those who
are religiously opposed to bearing arms has been recognized in this country
since colonial times. Both the individual colonies" and the Continental
Congress 2 sought to provide this exemption. Shortly after the Revolution,
the question, in the form of a proposed amendment, was presented and
debated at the first Congress before being abandoned. 3
The first Federal Draft Act was passed at the height of the Civil War. 4
under any law administered by the Veterans Administration." The Robison court overcame
this hurdle because there plaintiffs sought only a favorable declaratory judgment rather than
affirmative relief. 352 F. Supp. at 859 n.13.
- 467 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1972).
- 41 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. May 14, 1973).
" United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624. (1931). See also Hamilton v. Regents of the
Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934). See generally Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions:
A View in the Light of Torasco v. Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252, 263-269 (1963); Kurland, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 UNIV. OF CHICAGO L. REv. 1, 23-25 (1961).
1 The states and statutes are enumerated in Macintosh v. United States, 42 F.2d 845, 847-
48 n.1 (2d Cir. 1930), rev'd, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
" See Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: a View in the Light of Torasco v. Watkins,
51 GEO. L.J. 252, 256-57 (1963).
11 See Cohen and Greenspan, Conscientious Objection, Democratic Theory, and the Constitu-
tion, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv., 389, 390 n.3 (1968).
" Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 731.
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It provided no exemption for conscientious objectors other than a general
"substitution" provision which allowed for a payment not exceeding $300
in lieu of performance of military duty. 5 However, negative reaction was
so strong that the Act was amended in 1864 to provide for the non-
combatant military service of conscientious objectors who could suffi-
ciently prove their religious motivation for seeking the exemption."6
The Draft Act of 191711 provided an exemption from military service
only for members "of any well-recognized religious sect or organization
: . . whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate
in war in any form. . . ."" While the statute in this form provided an
objective standard by which the sincerity of the individual's belief could
be measured, its effect was to deny exemptions to truly sincere persons
whose religious tenets were strong but were not "well-recognized." This
potential constitutional infirmity was tested in The Selective Draft Law
Cases,19 a group of appeals from convictions of draft evasion. The defen-
dants claimed that the statute, as written, violated the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment. The contention was summa-
rily answered by Chief Justice White, speaking for a unanimous court:
And we pass without anything but statement the proposition that an estab-
lishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repug-
nant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption clauses of the act
to which we at the outset referred, because we think its unsoundness is too
apparent to require us to do more.n
Perhaps a due process argument (i.e., that the statute arbitrarily and
unjustifiedly distinguished between those who were members of well-
recognized sects and those whose religious beliefs, though equally sincere,
were not a consequence of membership in a "well-recognized" group)
would have compelled a more detailed justification for the classification
scheme embodied in the statute. However, as the contentions were phrased
in first, rather than fifth, amendment terms, the Court was not faced with
having to either justify or invalidate the exemption scheme on this ground.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 19401 eliminated the re-
quirement of membership in recognized pacifist sects and organizations.
The exemption was thus extended to anyone who, by reason of religious
" Id. § 13, 12 Stat. 733.
' Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9.
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
Id. § 4, 40 Stat. 78 (emphasis added).
" 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
Id. at 389-90.
One prominent commentator has said that "ftihe decision is as sound as the reason
given for it." Kurland, Of Church, and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
22 (1961).
1' Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
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training and belief, was conscientiously opposed to participation in war of
any form."2 In addition, this statute provided that the conscientious objec-
tor may either be assigned to non-combatant service or, if the objector is
opposed to performing such non-combatant service, he may instead be
assigned to "work of national importance under civilian direction."23
In 1948 Congress sought to clarify its meaning of "religious training
and belief" by adding the following language in its new Selective Service
Act:21
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising
from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociologi-
cal, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
The requirement that the belief have relation to a "Supreme Being"
came into question in 1965 in United States v. Seeger . 21 Seeger came from
a Roman Catholic home and was a student of Quaker beliefs. Although he
did not explicitly disavow any belief in a "Supreme Being" and, indeed,
acknowledged that "the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative
intelligence," '2 Seeger refused to assert a simple belief or disbelief in exist-
ence of a deity. Rather, he preferred to leave the question of the existence
of God open, explaining that "skepticism or disbelief in the existence of
God did not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever. ,28 He
supported this view by noting that Aristotle, Plato, and Spinoza envi-
sioned ethical systems of intellectual and moral integrity "without belief
in God, except in the remotest sense. '2
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Clark, affirmed the
reversal by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of Seeger's convic-
tion for refusal to submit to induction2 0 The Second Circuit had held that
the classification between kinds of religious belief drawn by the line of the
"Supreme Being" requirement was violative of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.' The Supreme Court vitiated the statute's literal
discrimination between religious beliefs with the following test: whether
the applicant for the conscientious objector exemption has "[a] sincere
and meaningful belief which occupies . . .a place parallel to that filled
22 Id. § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
23 Id.
24 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, Stat. 604.
1 Id. § 66), 62 Stat. 613.
2- 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 187.
11 Id. at 166.
"Id.
-- 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
31 Id. at 854.
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by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption . '.'..32
Accordingly, the Court held that Seeger's "belief" constituted a belief
sufficiently parallel to the belief in a traditional God held by those unques-
tionably qualified for the exemption and was therefore sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the statute.1
3
The 1967 amendment to the Selective Service Act 34 eliminated the
"Supreme Being" clause, while retaining the requirement of religious
training and belief and the language excluding from the conscientious
objector exemption those whose beliefs are "essentially political, sociologi-
cal, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code. '35
Three years later this blanket exclusion was ruled invalid in Welsh v.
United States, 3 in which the Supreme Court held that the Seeger
requirement of "belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by God" may well be satisfied by beliefs of those "whose
consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical or religious beliefs,
would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a
part of an instrument of war. 37 The Court sought to disclaim any intention
of extending the Seeger ruling,3 pointing out that opposition to war stem-
ming from moral or ethical beliefs held with the strength of religious con-
viction was "religious" and, as such, entitled the registrant to the conscien-
tious objector exemption.39
3" 380 U.S. at 176.
13 Id. at 187.
The validity of the reasoning in Seeger is questioned in Lurie, Conscientious Objection:
The Constitutional Questions, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 138, 141 (1971). He suggests that "the Court
stretched the statutory language to include him [Seeger] only to avoid the constitutional
infirmities that his exclusion might present."
"' Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451 et seq. (1970).
50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970).
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
" Id. at 344.
"We vote to reverse this conviction because of its fundamental inconsistency with United
States v. Seeger." Id. at 335.
' Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the result but not in the reasoning of the majority. He
objected that the majority's definition of a non-religious belief as "religious" if held with
sufficient intensity contradicted the obvious intent of Congress; i.e., to distinguish between
non-religious and religious beliefs. Indeed, Justice Harlan refers to Seeger as "a feat of judicial
surgery" in removing the theistic requirement of the statute, and further characterizes the
majority opinion in Welsh as a "lobotomy" in removing the distinction between religiously
acquired beliefs and those acquired from secular studies. 398 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Concluding that "the common denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction
with which a belief is held," Justice Harlan would have decided that the statute as written
was offensive to the Establishment Clause as under-inclusive, and that this inherent uncon-
stitutionality must be either eliminated or the statute must be expanded to cure this Consti-
tutional infirmity. 398 U.S. at 358. Finally, he argued that the more satisfactory choice and
that more nearly in accord with the will of Congress would be judicial expansion so as to
include non-religious conscientious objectors, like Welsh, within the ambit of the exempting
statute. 398 U.S. at 361-67.
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Today, then, to qualify for classification as a conscientious objector,
the registrant must show that he objects to all war in any form,40 and that
his opposition is based upon religious training and belief. That religious
training and belief need not relate to the belief in the existence of a specific
deity (Seeger) but where the opposition is sincere and deeply held the
training and belief need only occupy a place in life parallel to that of a
traditional theology even if based on moral, philosophical or ethical
grounds (Welsh)."
The great significance of the Welsh decision may be attested to by the large volume of
commentary material that it fostered. The following is but a sampling of the more important
articles that have been written with specific reference to Welsh: Brandon, The Conscientious
Objector Exemption, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 274 (1971); Denno, Welsh Reaffirms Seeger:
From a Remarkable Feat of Judicial Surgery to a Lobotomy, 46 IND. L.J. 37 (1970); Note,
Conscientious Objectors: Recent Developments and a New Appraisal, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1426
(1970); Note, Justice Hugo Black: A Question of Conscience and Conspiracy: Welch v. United
States, 17 Loy. L. REv. 105 (1971).
," Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
' That the high premium placed on sincerity and belief in something more than a merely
personal code may well work a hardship on the less articulate, educationally disadvantaged
poor and minority groups was acknowledged by Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, the National Director of
Selective Service. At a news conference held the day after the Welsh decision, Dr. Tarr said
that the likelihood of gaining draft exempt status increases "the better trained a man is and
the more sharpened his intellect in the matter of religion and philosophy." N.Y. Times, June
17, 1970, at 13, col. 1.
Indeed, the Welsh test is criticised by Brandon, The Conscientious Objector Exemption,
40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 274 (1971), primarily on these grounds:
[Because the test is subjective], [t]he difficulty is compounded where the applicant
is uneducated. Inarticulate claims are viewed by local boards as insincere. Poor regis-
trants cannot afford to hire legal counsel to prepare an adequate C.O. claim or a
subsequent appeal. Nor is free draft counselling generally available in poor urban or
rural areas. Minority applicants, who are generally poor and uneducated, carry the
heaviest burden of discrimination. Not only must they often face the racial prejudice
of largely white local draft boards, but also their political views may find disfavor
among conservative members. The Welsh test, therefore, places a disproportionately
heavy burden upon those in our country already overburdened with injustice-the
poor, the minorities, and the uneducated.
Id. at 275-76.
Brandon also focuses on, among other things, the problems facing the inarticulate who
seek to demonstrate sincerity, the question of the "registrant's demeanor as a significant
indication of his sincerity," and problems raised where a claimant's beliefs are
"incomprehensible," unorthodox, or unfamiliar to members of local boards. Id. at 283-87.
But see Local Board Mem. No. 107, 4 SEL. SEav. L. RP. 2200:16, 17 (1970).
Boards are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them 'incomprehensible.'
Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held
and whether they govern his actions both in word and deed.
Local Board Mem. 107, Criteria for Classification of Conscientious Objectors, July 6,
1970, set out in full as 4 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 2200:16 (1970) was promulgated to assist the
Selective Service local boards in defining the increasingly subjective criteria of eligibility for
the conscientious objector exemption. It provides, in part:
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ALTERNATIVE SERVICE
The successful claimant for the conscientious objector exemption
must, in lieu of induction pursuant to the random lottery selection, 42 per-
form alternative service for a twenty-four month period. 3 Alternative serv-
ice requirements for conscientious objectors have been sustained time and
again against thirteenth amendment (involuntary servitude) challenges"
4. The primary test that must be used is the test of sincerity with which the belief is
held. The board should be convinced by information presented to it that the regis-
trant's personal history reveals views and actions strong enough to demonstrate that
expediency is not the basis of his claim.
5. The belief upon which conscientious objection is based must be the primary con-
trolling force in the man's life.
6. The term "religious training and belief" as used in the law may include solely
moral or ethical beliefs, even though the registrant himself may not characterize these
beliefs as "religious" in the traditional sense, or may expressly characterize them as
not "religious."
7. The registrant need not believe in a traditional "God" or a "Supreme Being" to
be considered favorably.
8. The registrant's conscientious objection to war must stem from his moral, ethical,
or religious beliefs about what is right and should be done and what is wrong and
should be shunned, and he must hold these beliefs with the strength of traditional
religious conviction.
9. In order for the local board to find that a registrant's moral and ethical beliefs are
against participation in war in any form and are held with the strength of traditional
religious conviction, the local board should consider the nature and history of the
process by which he acquired such beliefs. The registrant must demonstrate that his
ethical or moral convictions were gained through training, study, contemplation, or
other activity, comparable in rigor and dedication to the processes by which traditional
religious convictions are formulated.
For a critical analysis of these guidelines, particularly the training requirement in paragraph
9, see Silard, Comments: Invalid Conscientious Objector Classification Criteria of Local
Board Memorandum 107: The Asserted Training Requirement, 4 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 4009
(1971).
" 32 C.F.R. § 1660.4(a) (1972):
A non-volunteer will not be ordered to perform alternative service in lieu of induction
before registrants with his RSN (Random Selection Number) who are classified in
Class 1-A or 1-A-0 are ordered for induction.
,1 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(j)(1970) in part provides:
Any person claiming exemption .. .because of. . . conscientious objections whose
claim is sustained by the local board .. .shall . . .. in lieu of . . .induction, be
ordered by his local board, subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe,
to perform .. .such civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
health, safety or interest as the local board pursuant to Presidential regulations may
deem appropriate . . ..
Of course, prior to such selection the conscientious objector may voluntarily seek to
perform alternative service, 32 C.F.R. § 1660.3 (1972), such action being roughly analogous
to enlisting for military service as opposed to being conscripted.
" See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936
(1968); Howze v. United States, 272 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1959); Heflin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798
(5th Cir. 1944); United States v. Thorn, 317 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. La. 1970).
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
as well as against first amendment challenges. 5
Among other things, the regulations governing alternative service"
provide that appropriate employment be limited to employment by a polit-
ical subdivision of the United States, or by a non-profit organization pri-
marily engaged in either a charitable activity conducted for the benefit of
the general public or a program for the improvement of the public health
or welfare, or such an activity thereof although not within the context of a
formal "program. 4 7 The acceptability of a specific job shall be based on
consideration of the following factors (the final three of which may, at the
discretion of the State Director, be waived):
(1) National ... health, . . . safety or . . . interest. The job must fulfill
specifications of the law and regulations.
(2) Noninterference with the competitive labor market. The registrant can-
not be assigned to a job which is applied for by other qualified people who
are not registrants in Class 1-0 ....
(3) Compensation. The compensation will provide a standard of living to
registrant reasonably comparable to the standard of living the same man
would have enjoyed had he gone into the service.
(4) Skill and talent utilization. A registrant may use his special skills.
(5) Job location. A registrant will work outside his community of residence.' 8
The registrant must submit up to three SSS Forms 156, on which he
suggests jobs that may be suitable. Disapproval by the State Director of
any or all of the proposed jobs may be reviewed on one occasion by the
National Director. If no acceptable job has been found and sixty days have
elapsed from the time of the registrant's application for alternative service,
the local board may assign the registrant to a job selected by the State
Director. 49
The requirements for alternative service have been viewed by at least
one court as a Congressional attempt "to alleviate the unfairness which
results if conscientious objectors continue to enjoy the fruits of civilian life
while their fellow citizens are conscripted for onerous and sometimes haz-
ardous duty."50 That is not to say, however, that the disruption must
approximate that caused by entry into military service, as was suggested
by a Local Board Memorandum 5' issued by then-Director Lewis B. Her-
shey in 1962 and amended in 1968. Such a rule was struck down in the
," See, e.g., United States v. Milligan, 457 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Board-
man, 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1969).
11 32 C.F.R. §§ 1660 et seq. (collected at 36 Fed. Reg. 23384 (1971)).
47 32 C.F.R. § 1660.5(a)-(c) (1972).
4K 32 C.F.R. § 1660.6(a) (1)-(5) (1972).
32 C.F.R. § 1660.7 (1972).
United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1969).
, Local Board Mem. No. 64 (as revised 1968), rescinded Feb. 8, 1972, 4 SEL. SERv. L. REP.
2183 (1972).
19 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1973
Fourth Circuit in Hackney v. Tarr,52 where a New York City resident who
had worked as an inhalation therapist supervisor in a medical center ap-
plied to his local board to be permitted to continue this work as his alterna-
tive service. His application was rejected because it "would not disrupt the
registrant's way of life. '5 3 He was then ordered to report to a Greensboro,
North Carolina hospital where his duties were "menial and did not require
any education or training of the sort [he] had."" The court ruled that the
Local Board Memorandum appeared to "require disruption solely for the
sake of disruption" and "subvert[ed] the expressed statutory purpose [of
work performed in the national interest] and general design of the
[Military Selective Service] Act,"5 and concluded that "vindictiveness
for the sake of vindictiveness and disruption for the sake of disruption have
no place in the execution of a statute which provides the public interest
as the exclusive standard for administration.""6
Nevertheless, the local board retains great discretion in passing upon
the suitability of suggested alternative service jobs. For example, a local
board in Spring Valley, New York, promulgated its own "rule of thumb"
for compliance with the requirement that the applicant perform alterna-
tive service outside of his own community-its rule provided that the site
of the alternative service must be at least fifty miles away. Pursuant to this
"rule of thumb," the board mandated that a conscientious objector who
had been doing inner city work with young boys through a religious pro-
gram in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, forty-five miles from
Spring Valley, leave this job and perform his alternative service require-
ment at Ellis Hospital in Schenectady, New York, 150 miles away.57
Availability of judicial review of local board decisions, particularly in
the area of job selection for fulfillment of alternative service requirements,
is a controversial topic. 58 By statute, pre-induction judicial review of classi-
fication of processing of draft registrants is available only as a defense to
a criminal prosecution.59 However, case law, although denying review of a
52 460 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 576, citing local draft board decision.
54 Id.
Id. at 578-79.
Id. at 579.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1970, at 29, col. 3. See also, Walkup, "Swords Into Plowshares":
Alternative Service Requirements for Conscientious Objectors, 6 HAlv. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. Lm.
L. REV. 505, 506-17 (1971); Silard, Invalid Disruption Rules for Conscientious Objector Alter-
native Service, 3 COLUM. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIOHTs LAw 136, 149-54 (1971).
"' On the general topic of judicial review of Selective Service activities and procedures, see
Winick, Direct Judicial Review of the Actions of the Selective Service System, 69 MICH. L.
REV. 55 (1970).
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, § 10(b)(3), 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1970).
Of course, the registrant who does submit to induction may challenge the validity of his
induction order by petitioning for habeas corpus. See Winick, supra note 58 at 56.
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discretionary action of a local board,"0 indicates that pre-induction review
will be available where the draft board has exceeded its authority through
a clear departure from its statutory mandates.6
Clearly, then, the conscientious objector does not enjoy entirely clear
sailing. He remains subject to the intricacies of an extremely complex
administrative agency from which errors and irregularities are almost ex-
pected, 2 and must comply with all "reasonable" requirements of his alter-
native service employer, 3 or else "be deemed to have knowingly failed or
neglected to perform a duty required of him under the Military Selective
Service Act. '6 4 A criminal conviction pursuant to the Selective Service Act
may result in up to five years imprisonment, a $10,000 fine, or both.65
VETERANS' BENEFITS LEGISLATION
While various forms of veterans' benefit legislation have been imple-
mented in the United States since colonial times, the prerequisite for ac-
quisition of these benefits in most instances was an injury sustained in
defense of the state or country such as would render the recipient incapable
of earning a living. Such benefits were not intended to provide general
vocational assistance for all those who returned from military service, but
rather, were intended basically as compensation for economic losses di-
rectly sustained as a result of physical injury suffered by the soldier.6
Indeed, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 191867 provided assistance in
restoring vocational opportunity for veterans. However, eligible veterans
fell into only two categories-first, those whose service-sustained injuries
"prevented resumption of former occupations or the successful entry into
new ones, but whose vocational rehabilitation was feasible;" and second,
those "whose service-connected disabilities did not prevent their return to
10 Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968).
11 Ostereich v. Selective Service System, 393 U.S. 238 (1968). See Walkup, supra note 57 at
520-21, and Winick, supra note 58 at 72. See also, Naskiewitz v. Lawyer, 456 F.2d 1166 (2d
Cir. 1972), commented on in Second Circuit Note, 47 ST. JoHN's L. Rsv. 219, 229 (1972).
'2 United States v. Chaudron, 425 F.2d 605, 608 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970):
[E]rrors in processing a registrant for induction or alternative civilian work are not
infrequent; Oshatz v. United States, 404 F.2d 9, 12 (9th Cir. 1968). Even the most
casual glance at the case law will reveal a staggering array of deviations from the
regulations.
63 In United States v. Bums, 450 F.2d 44 (10th Cir. 1971), the court held that a request that
the alternative service performer cut his hair, although the hospital at which the service was
being performed had no rule prohibiting male employees from wearing long hair, was a
"reasonable" work rule that had to be obeyed. See also United States v. Phillips, 423 F.2d
1134 (5th Cir. 1970).
32 C.F.R. § 1660.8 (1971).
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
66 See, Legislative History of Veterans' Benefits, 38 U.S.C. (1959).
67 Ch. 107, 40 Stat. 617 (1918).
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gainful occupation."18 It will be noted that the common denominator of the
members of these two groups is that service-connected injuries had been
sustained. It was not until World War II that legislation was developed to
assist the re-entry into civilian life of all returning servicemen."
By the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944,10 popularly known as
the "GI Bill," comprehensive legislation for the readjustment of returning
veterans into the mainstream of civilian life was finally enacted. Its pri-
mary thrusts were in the areas of education, vocational counselling, and
placement, and federally guaranteed loans for purchase of personal and
business property. Similar benefits for veterans of the Korean conflict were
provided by the Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1952."1
Finally, consolidation of all laws relating to veterans' benefits was
achieved with the enactment of Title 38 of the United States Code in
1958.72 However, the provisions relating to educational assistance were only
applicable to those who served in the armed forces during the time of the
Korean conflict.73 It was not until 1966 that these provisions were repealed74
and replaced by those of the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of
1966, T" which sought to provide educational assistance and home loan ben-
efits to men serving in the military after the termination of the Korean
conflict.
Educational assistance is now to be provided to "eligible veterans,"76
which term is defined as "any veteran who (A) served on active duty for a
period of more than 180 days . . . or (B) was discharged or released from
active duty . . . for a service-connected disability."77 "Active duty" is
defined as full-time duty in the armed forces or as a commissioned officer
of the Regular or Reserve Corps of the Public Health Service or of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (with certain minor
qualifications), or service as a cadet or as a midshipman at a military
" Legislative History of Veterans' Benefits, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1,34 (1959).
" Statement on Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944; President's Message to Congress,
78th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1400 (1944).
70 Act of June 22, 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284.
Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 875, 66 Stat. 663.
Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1105. The new Title 38 included fields
covered by The Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, 71 Stat. 83 and, as such,
became the completely consolidated codification of all Veterans Administration and veterans'
benefits law.
1 The educational benefits chapter, Chapter 33 of the original Title 38, was entitled "Educa-
tion of Korean Conflict Veterans," and the subchapter of definitions, § 1601, made specific
that the chapter related only to those who served in the armed forces during the period of
the Korean conflict. 38 U.S.C. § 1601 (1959), repealed by Act of March 3, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-358, § 4(a), 80 Stat. 12, 23.
1, Act of March 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-358 § 4(a), 80 Stat. 12, 23.
71 Pub. L. No. 89-358, § 2, 80 Stat. 12, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq.
' 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a) (1970).
" 38 U.S.C. § 1652(a)(1) (1970).
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academy.7" It is these definitional sections that are the bones of contention
in the cases with which we are dealing, as they make no provision for
performers of alternative service prescribed for those men classified as
conscientious objectors. The claim of the present plaintiffs is that this
exclusion renders these statutes unconstitutional, as discriminatorily de-
nying to them benefits to which they claim to be equally entitled.
THE FirtH AMENDMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The obvious problem when the courts are confronted with federal
legislation is that the fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause,
and only those classifications which are so discriminatory as to violate the
due process clause are struck down.79 A brief look at the standards of
judicial review in discrimination cases is a prerequisite to understanding
the Robison and Hernandez decisions.
In testing the constitutionality of legislative classifications, the Su-
preme Court has evolved two standards of review: the "strict," or "rigid
scrutiny" standard and the "restrained review" or "rational basis" stan-
dard. 0 The subject matter of the classification generally determines which
standard is applicable. Strict scrutiny has been used by the Court in deter-
mining the validity of two types of classifications: those which create a
''suspect classification" and those which affect a "fundamental interest."
Such classifications are said to deny equal protection unless justified by a
"compelling governmental interest."'" Racial classifications are frequent
targets of strict scrutiny. In the words of Mr. Justice Black:
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.2
Other groups of suspect classifications are those based upon national an-
cestry, or alienage. 3
7- 38 U.S.C. § 101(21) (1970).
71 See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
See generally Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. Rxv.
341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-1132
(1969).
One of the earliest suggestions of a dual standard of review appeared in a footnote dictum
in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
1, In his dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Harlan
provides a critical analysis of the Court's use of strict scrutiny. Believing that "the more
recent extensions have been unwise," he would reserve the compelling interest doctrine only
for suspect racial classifications. 394 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
'3 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n.,
334 U.S. 410 (1948); United States v. Khan, 336 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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Also subject to rigid scrutiny are classifications infringing upon "fun-
damental interests." This category is more problematical, since the ques-
tion of what constitutes a fundamental interest is almost always open to
debate." Beyond the fundamental rights specifically enumerated in the
first ten amendments, some of the fundamental interests recognized by the
Court to date include aspects of voting, 5 procreation," and interstate
travel . 7 Education had been considered a candidate for such treatment,
but a recent Supreme Court pronouncement has now precluded such a
development.88
Restrained judicial review has also been referred to as "permissive
review," the "reasonableness test," and the "rational relationship test."'89
Unlike those cases in which strict scrutiny is utilized, the government has
no burden to establish a compelling state interest for the classification. It
is the party challenging the statute who must demonstrate that the classi-
fication is arbitrary and unreasonable, and furthers no legitimate state
goal.9 0 Where inherently suspect classifications or fundamental interests
are not at stake, the courts defer more readily to legislative judgment,
stepping in only where a statute is so unreasonable as to be beyond the
power of sovereignty.
It is unnecessary to say that the "equal protection of the laws" required by
Justice Rehnquist recently echoed Justice Harlan's misgivings about the use of strict scru-
tiny. See note 81 supra. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Supreme
Court held that denial of workmen's compensation benefits to illegitimate children violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, as such discrimination relating to
status of birth was "justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise." Id. at
176. In the course of his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist pondered "[How] is the Court
to know when it is dealing with a 'fundamental personal right' "? 406 U.S. at 181 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
Indeed, in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court rejected plaintiffs' conten-
tion that "the right to decent housing" was a fundamental interest protected by the Constitu-
tion. 405 U.S. at 74. Clearly, the criteria for "fundamental interests" are decided on an ad
hoc basis. See Comment, New Tenets in Old Houses: Changing Concepts of Equal Protection
in Lindsey v. Normet, 58 VA. L. REv. 930. (1972).
11 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (excessive filing fees for candidates seeking a place
on the ballot in local primary elections); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (excessive poll tax).
" Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942).
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for entitlement
to state welfare benefits held to be a burden on the freedom of interstate travel).
11 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1295-1302 (1973). Of
course, the arguments in the Robison and Hernandez cases were made prior to the San
Antonio case and, not surprisingly, the brief for the conscientious objector in Robison
challenged the denial of educational assistance as an interference with a fundamental inter-
est. Brief for Petitioner at 13-16.
"' See HAv. L. RFv., supra note 80.
" McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the States from resorting to
classification for the purposes of legislation. Numerous and familiar decisions
of this court establish that they have a wide range of discretion in that regard.
But the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike. "
When reviewing legislation under this test, the Court must consider
the purpose of the legislation and the relevance of the classification to that
purpose. The inquiry focuses upon the degree to which individuals are
"similarly circumstanced" and whether the legislature has acted rationally
in treating them differently. In Tigner v. Texas, 12 for example, certain anti-
trust legislation was enacted, excluding from its scope activities in agricul-
tural products and livestock. Justice Frankfurter conceded that agriculture
price and production might pose a threat to the community through com-
bination but stated that:
• . .[I]n our national economy, agriculture expresses functions and forces
different from the other elements in the total economic process. Certainly
these are differences which may be acted upon by the lawmakers."
Justice Frankfurter recognized that persons who are similarly situated in
respect to one purpose of a statute may be differently situated in other
respects, and therefore dissimilar legislative treatment may be tolerated.
Since the demise of substantive due process the Supreme Court has
consistently yielded to legislative judgment in the fields of economics and
social welfare. Justice Cardozo, along with Justices Holmes and Brandeis,
was a staunch defender of Congressional judgment in such areas:
The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment . . . . "When such a
contention comes here we naturally require a showing that by no reasonable
possibility can the challenged legislation fall within the wide range of discre-
tion permitted to the Congress.''
More recently, Justice Stewart announced that "in the area of economics
and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.""
'1 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
02 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
o Id. at 147. See Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 80, at 365-66.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67
(1936); see Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1920) (Holmes and Brandeis,
JJ., dissenting). Particularly in the area of state regulation of business activities, the Supreme
Court has deferred to legislative wisdom. Since 1941, in only one case, Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957), has the Court invalidated economic regulatory legislation on equal protection
grounds. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMisA, J. CHOPER, THE AMERIcAN CoNsTITUTON 323 (1964).
,5 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). In Dandridge, the Court was confronted
19 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1973
As noted earlier, the fifth amendment, unlike the fourteenth, does not
on its face embody the element of equality. However, the courts have
reasoned that an arbitrary congressional classification acts as a denial of
due process, and equal protection guidelines are freely borrowed." For
example, in Boiling v. Sharpe7 it was held that the denial of an integrated
school environment in the District of Columbia was such an "arbitrary
deprivation of liberty" as to be violative of due process." In Flemming v.
Nestor," however, an allegedly discriminatory provision of the federal so-
cial security program was upheld against the due process challenge. This
provision provided that where an immigrant is deported pursuant to cer-
tain paragraphs of the Immigration and Nationality Act he forfeits his
social security benefits. °10 In its holding, the Court stated that the alleged
penalty was not unreasonable:
[A] person covered by the [Social Security] Act has not such a right in
benefit payments as would make every defeasance of "accrued" interests
violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.''
After a brief discussion of possible congressional purposes, 02 the Court
concluded that "this provision of the [Social Security] Act cannot be
condemned as so lacking in rational justification as to offend due pro-
cess."l03
The extent of the "equal protection element" of the fifth amendment
with a Maryland family welfare program which produced a disparity in grants. A maximum
limit was established on the amount of money that could be received by an individual family
unit. In a large family, the "standard of need" based in part on the number of members in
the family, would exceed the maximum grant that the family could receive under the regula-
tion. In effect, then, the amount received per person decreased as the number of persons
within the family increased. In holding that the state's action was rationally-based and "free
from invidious discrimination," the Court said:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the
States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.
Id. at 486-87.
0 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.497 (1954).
JT]he concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our Ameri-
can ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is
a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and,
therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as
this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process.
Id. at 499.
'7 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
11 Id. at 500.
19 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1969).
363 U.S. at 611.
02 Id. at 611-12.
'03 Id. at 612.
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has not, as yet, been definitively determined. However, there is no reason
to assume that equality is any less essential to due process than liberty.' °0
But for now the words of Judge Garrity in Robison will summarize the
situation:
[T]he appropriateness of subjecting federal legislation to equal protection
analysis can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.' 5
THE ROBISON AND HERNANDEZ DECISIONS
Central to the Robison and Hernandez decisions is whether the gen-
eral scheme of the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, in which
certain benefits are to be conferred upon "eligible veterans," defined so as
to exclude conscientious objectors who have fulfilled their alternative serv-
ice requirements, violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
That is, is the exclusion of conscientious objectors rationally related to the
purposes of the Act? Both courts applied the rational basis standard of
review (since neither suspect classification nor fundamental interest was
involved) but reached opposite results. The Robison court viewed the ex-
clusion as bearing no rational relationship to the purposes of the legislation
in question, thus rendering the legislation unconstitutional. Meanwhile,
the Hernandez court, as noted earlier,'1 held that the manifest differences
between conscientious objectors and members of the armed forces warrant
separate classifications for the purposes of Congress, and that, therefore,
"the classification scheme is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable" and is
thus not violative of the fifth amendment. 0 7
Conveniently, for the purposes of the present discussion, the aims of
the Veterans' Benefits Act are enumerated in the act itself as follows:
(1) enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed Forces of the
United States,
(2) extending the benefits of a higher education to qualified and deserving
young persons who might not otherwise be able to afford such an education,
(3) providing vocational readjustment and restoring lost educational oppor-
tunities to those service men and women whose careers have been interrupted
or impeded by reason of active duty after January 31, 1955, and
(4) aiding such persons in attaining the vocational and educational status
which they might normally have aspired to and obtained had they not served
their country.I' s
It will be noticed that (2), (3) and (4) are basically variations on a
See generally Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 80.
,o Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 848, 855 (D. Mass. 1973).
'" See text accompanying note 6 supra.
107 339 F. Supp. 913, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
10 38 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
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single theme: extending educational benefits to young persons whose nor-
mal educational progress has been impeded by national service. Thus, the
present discussion refers to the two purposes of the Act-one, making
service in the Armed Forces more attractive, and two, providing compensa-
tion for lost educational opportunities.' °0
The Robison court began its analysis by examining whether the exclu-
sion of conscientious objectors who have completed alternative service
bears a rational relation to the first purpose of the statute. The question
is, does the granting of benefits to military veterans and not to conscien-
tious objectors attract any men into the military service who would other-
wise seek alternative service?
An affirmative answer presupposes that both courses are available to
them. However, one who is genuinely sincere in conscientiously objecting
to his participation in war due to a "religious" belief will not sway and join
the military simply because educational benefits will become available to
him if he does. Thus, the exclusion of conscientious objectors will increase
membership in the military only to the extent that insincere claimants for
the exemption will be dissuaded from pursuing that course because of
educational benefits offered to military personnel. That is, to this group
the military becomes more attractive.
However, as Judge Garrity stated in Robison, "this group, if it indeed
exists, is surely a small one, for its members are largely irrational peo-
ple.""10 Selective Service regulations and procedures are designed to sepa-
rate the truly sincere claimant for the conscientious objector exemption
from the insincere claimant, whose application for the exemption is based
solely on personal desire to avoid military service.'' One cannot but seri-
ously doubt that it was Congress' intent to grant educational benefits in
order to test the sincerity of the potential conscientious objector.
The Robison court therefore concluded that it did not appear plausible
that the exclusion of objectors who have performed alternative service
bears any reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute of making the
military more attractive. The second purpose of the Act, to compensate
those who have performed national service for educational opportunities
that they have lost, presents more relevant consideration. Here the neces-
sary question is whether the two groups are "similarly situated" with re-
gard to this purpose of the legislation, and, if so, whether there is valid
justification for different treatment of the two groups with regard to this
purpose.
The question of whether the alternative service performed constitutes
" The Robison court deems the second purpose to be primary, citing the legislative history
of the Act. See 352 F. Supp. at 857 n.10.
352 F. Supp. at 857.
See note 41 supra.
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a disruption to normal educational opportunity equal to that sustained by
a member of the armed forces is difficult to answer with any certainty. The
Robison court concluded that it did. The Hernandez court, on the other
hand, called the differences between the two groups "manifest," "recogniz-
able," and "sufficient to warrant separate classification."" 2 However, the
necessity of relating the differences or similarities of the two groups to the
purpose of the legislation was recognized in Robison but not in Hernandez.
The examples of differences between the two groups given in Hernandez
are of a general nature: "The status of a soldier creates greater limitations
on personal freedom and greater potential for hazardous duty than the
status of conscientious objector. The soldier is further limited in his actions
as compared to the conscientious objector by the restrictions of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice.""' 3 Valid-as th-y--may be, these distinctions
have nothing to do with the disruption of educational careers. It is submit-
ted that the Hernandez opinion would have been strengthened by mention,
for example, that the alternative service performer is more likely to be in
a position to attend school on a part-time basis in the vicinity of his
alternative service employment than the member of the Armed Forces,
who, even if stationed in the continental United States, may, at a mo-
ment's notice, be given a duty assignment of a temporary or permanent
nature that would absolutely preclude educational pursuits.
The Robison opinion, meanwhile, examined the issue of equality of
disruption with reference to the purpose of the legislation. The court deter-
mined that the disruption with regard to educational pursuits sustained
by the members of both groups is equal, and that therefore the performers
of alternative service are entitled to the same benefits as provided by the
Veterans' Benefits Act. Consequently, the court concluded, the denial of
these benefits to the members of one group is unconstitutional.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Report"4 was
cited extensively by the Robison court as evidence of the intent of the
legislators to compensate for lost time from civilian life and for the conse-
quent disadvantage faced when competing with "civilian contemporaries
who generally pursue educational objectives."'1 5 What was not cited by the
Robison court, however, is the frequent reference in the Report to "persons
sacrificing civil lives for military duty,""' 6 to the total military obligation
which "generally extends over a period of six years,""' 7 to service "in the
1 339 F. Supp. 913, 915.
113 Id.
"' SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, COLD WAR VETERANS' READJUSTMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT, S. REP. No. 269, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1966).
Id. at 10.
'' Id. at 2.
,, Id. at 6.
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Armed Forces throughout troubled parts of the world, thereby subjecting
themselves to the mental and physical hazards as well as the economic and
family detriments which are peculiar to military service . . .,,,,8 and to
"extended tours of active military service."'"
CONCLUSION
Although the alternative service is obligatory, it is performed as a
civilian. Although there are limitations as to appropriate employment, 0
the conscientious objector may submit three choices of alternative service
jobs'' or, perhaps, retain a job that he had taken "anticipating that it
might later be approved as alternative service.""' Although he may be
required to work outside his community of residence,' 2 the alternative
service performer will (unless he successfully joins the Peace Corps, which
action would be voluntary)' work within the United States. Finally, as
suggested above, 25 the alternative service performer, whose assignment
will not change unless at his volition, or unless the State Director of Selec-
tive Service decides that the job that had been suitable for alternative
service has since ceased to be acceptable,' 0 will more likely be able to
attend school on a part-time basis once his job schedule is established than
the soldier on active duty, who is far more subject to instant relocation. It
is conceivable, then, that the Robison court erred in finding that the mem-
bers of the two groups are equally burdened and that benefits available to
the one must constitutionally be made available to the other. Thus, while
it is clear that the Robison court presents a correct legal analysis, it is not
so clear that it reached the correct result.
On the other hand, the Hernandez decision, in its terseness, appar-
ently failed to adequately consider the controlling principles but possibly,
in this case at least, reached the proper result. The court looked at only
one of the purposes of the legislation-that of making the military more
attractive-and, although it concluded that there are differences between
conscientious objectors who have performed alternative service and mili-
tary veterans, the dissimilarities were not examined in light of the legisla-
tive purposes of the statute.'"2 Nevertheless, the conclusion reached, that
"I Id. at 8.
Jig Id.
'l 32 C.F.R. §§ 1660.5, 1660.6 (1972).
321 32 C.F.R. §§ 1660.3, 1660.7(b) (1972).
22 32 C.F.R. § 1660.7(d) (1972).
1' 32 C.F.R. § 1660.6(a)(5) (1972).
"1 32 C.F.R. § 1660.6(a) (2) (1972).
'2 See text following note 113 supra.
11 32 C.F.R. § 1660.9(d) (1972).
'2 The Hernandez court termed the benefits in question as "fringe benefits." The court may
have been inferring that these benefits constituted merely a part of wages paid for services
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the statute should be upheld against constitutional challenge, may very
well be correct, although for reasons not appearing within the course of the
opinion.
rendered. Clearly the services rendered to the nation by these groups are different. Equally
as clear is the power of Congress to pay greater compensation to those whose services it deems
intrinsically more valuable. That is, the value of different services is a question of legislative
judgment into which no court should justifiably delve. But this purpose was not expressly
set forth by Congress in the Act and, apparently at least, neither court was willing to deem
this an implied purpose of Congress. The Hernandez court, rather, saw this as a means by
which to accomplish one of the recognized purposes, i.e., to make the military more attrac-
tive.

